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GAIA AS SCIENCE MADE MYTH: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
 
 
Celia Deane-Drummond 
 
 
The ability of human ‘subjects’ to perceive the natural world around them as ‘object’ and 
‘other’ than human is widely recognised as a necessary prerequisite for the birth of 
modern science.(1) Once the natural world is seen as purely materialistic, it can be 
understood through careful separation into its component parts. This so-called 
‘reductionist’ approach is the springboard of modern scientific method. The separation of 
the material from the divine, humanity from ‘nature’, God from creation, the soul from the 
body all collectively contribute to ‘dualistic’ patterns of thought. It is hardly surprising, 
then, given the antidualistic stance of many modern writers of ‘green’ theology, that 
scientific thought is also believed to have contributed to the ecological crisis. Grace 
Jantzen, for example, considers that the ‘metaphors of early modern science and its 
subsequent development have not been merely decorative, but have been models for 
the treatment both of women and of nature’.(2) Scientists can respond in a number of 
ways. One way is to insist that science is not as coldly objective as it appears. The early 
scientists were well aware of the supernatural, so that a spiritual horizon is compatible 
with modern science. All we need is a re-enchantment of science, though science itself 
remains intact. A more ‘organic’ approach is adopted instead of a ‘mechanistic’ one. For 
Griffin the individual purpose or telos of the individual parts becomes part of the revised 
science. This new science is still subject to criticism and so is ‘enchanted’, rather than 
‘sacred’.(3)  
 
An alternative, more radical approach, is one which looks towards a ‘holistic’ scientific 
method which is directed towards understanding the whole system, rather than the 
separate parts. This has been a general characteristic of the field of ecology for a 
number of years. However, it took the maverick scientist James Lovelock to popularise 
this idea and extend it to include other branches of science as well. Now ecological 
principles are broadened so that the whole earth, not just a single community, is 
considered to act as a giant ecosystem known as the Gaia hypothesis. Many green 
theologians and philosophers have warmed to this hypothesis in a way which would 
have been impossible with more traditional scientific views. However, often Lovelock's 
ideas have been taken up in an uncritical way by writers unaware of both the scientific 
anomalies and ethical ambiguities.(4) It is the purpose of this paper to examine the 
different scientific interpretations of Gaia and show the implications of these for 
environmental ethics. It is hoped that a critical examination of the ambiguous ethical 
implications of Gaia will contribute to the discussion of the relationship between science 
and faith. 
 
1. Scientific Models of Gaia 
 
When James Lovelock first proposed his hypothesis, he presented Gaia as a single 
unified model. He recognised that, unlike other planets in our solar system, the earth is 
quite unique in its composition of gases which act like a blanket around the earth.(5) A 
unique feature of the earth is the presence of a sufficient concentration of oxygen to 
support life. Lovelock was able to predict that other planets would be inhospitable for life 
by analysis of their atmospheres. He also showed that the temperature of the earth and 
its gaseous composition has stayed constant over millions of years, whereas since the 
sun is getting progressively hotter, one would have predicted a rise in the earth's 
temperature and a change in its gaseous composition. No-one disputes these scientific 
facts. Lovelock proposed a novel explanation to account for the apparently anomalous 
features found on earth. He suggested that not only does life adapt to environmental 
conditions, but life itself serves to regulate those conditions to keep them within the 
necessary boundaries to support life. Inspired by the poet William Golding, he gave the 
name Gaia to his hypothesis, drawn from the idea of mother goddess of ancient 
mythology.(6) 
 
The essential elegance of his hypothesis has attracted support from scientists and public 
alike. Moreover, as I hinted above, it offered a new way of approaching knowledge of the 
earth that looked at interactions on a whole planetary level — or geophysiology, to use 
Lovelock's nomenclature. Many scientists, however, were uneasy with Lovelock's ideas. 
One reason was that it seemed to suggest the idea of a purpose for life, namely to keep 
the environment constant. Such purpose or teleology is anathema to traditional science, 
which aims to provide purely rational explanations.(7) 
 
Lovelock refuted the charge of purposefulness by showing that a computer model 
system called ‘’Daisyworld’ could regulate the temperature of the earth automatically.(8) 
This model system shows changes in two populations of daisies, one of which is pale 
and reflects light and heat, while the other is dark and absorbs heat. The light daisies 
are presumed to have a higher temperature optimum for growth than the dark daisies. 
As the temperature rises, the numbers of light daisies increase, which leads to a drop in 
temperature as light is reflected from this variety. As the temperature falls, the dark 
daisies increase in number, which leads to a subsequent increase in surface 
temperature as more heat is absorbed. This computer model did not ‘prove’ his 
hypothesis, but showed that teleology need not be introduced into his model in order for 
it to work. 
 
Other scientists were prepared to accept some, but not all of Lovelock's ideas.(9) It is 
this range of possible interpretations of Gaia that can lead to confusion in the debate, 
especially for non-specialists. Evidence which supports one aspect of Gaia can 
sometimes be used to support the hypothesis in toto.(10) 
 
(a) The Interconnected Model 
This interpretation of Gaia requires us to make the least number of assumptions and is 
accepted by the majority of scientists. It says, simply, that living organisms on the planet, 
collectively known as the biota, influence the external environment. This stops short of 
suggesting that the biota regulates environmental conditions. In some ways this 
interpretation of Gaia adds relatively little to scientific knowledge since it has been 
known for many years that living things alter their external conditions, such as in the 
production of carbon dioxide in respiration.(11) Nonetheless, this view does, at least, 
encourage a more holistic approach to science so that the way different living things 
influence the atmospheric composition can be examined and tested. . According to this 
understanding of Gaia it is quite possible that some species will act to shift atmospheric 
conditions away from equilibrium and so destabilise the system. If scientists just look for 
stabilising systems they may miss those which act in an opposite way and so distort the 
evidence in favour of ‘regulation’ by the biota.(12) 
 
(b) The Homeostatic Process Model 
This model of Gaia proposes that the biota regulates the atmospheric conditions of the 
planet, a view which Lovelock insists is essential for his hypothesis. According to this 
view different species act in concert so as to produce conditions necessary for life. More 
correctly this could be described as a rheostat, as it brings conditions back to pre-set 
norms. It is quite possible that the regulation system would become ‘saturated’ and then 
shift to a new state of equilibrium. This would presumably entail the death of all those 
species which required the earlier range of conditions. Such a catastrophic event has 
already taken place in the lifetime of the earth with the shift from, anaerobic to aerobic 
conditions in what would have appeared as a massive ‘oxygen’ pollution event.(13) 
 
This rheostatic model sounds elegant, but it does beg a number of questions. For 
example, it is impossible to state which came first, the stable environmental conditions 
or life, adapted to such conditions. It is well known that inorganic systems have feedback 
mechanisms which keep conditions constant.(14) Biologists have sometimes used 
control systems theory taken from engineering as models to describe regulation in 
simple organisms.(15) It becomes far more difficult to envisage a control system with a 
sensor acting for all living organisms. While living things could, then, be seen as very 
much a contributory part of the rheostat system, there seems to be no obvious reason 
why life itself should persist per se in order for a rheostatic system to exist. In other 
words it is entirely possible that the new equilibrium state could be reached which 
effectively destroys all life, apart from possibly a few extremely resistant bacterial 
species. 
 
The evidence in support of homeostatic regulation has focused around different known 
cycles of inorganic compounds, such as sulphur or nitrogen. The sulphur cycle is well 
documented and I will describe it briefly here by way of illustration. Marine algae are 
known to produce gaseous dimethyl sulphide, or DMS, which is then carried to the land 
through dissolution in rain droplets. Hence the production of DMS is part of the 
geophysiological recycling of sulphur from the sea to the land. That such recycling takes 
place is not particularly controversial scientifically. However, Lovelock suggested, in 
addition, that DMS produced by the algae is part of a Gaian system of climate 
regulation. As the temperature rises the DMS produced by the algae increases. The 
DMS acts as nucleation sites for cloud droplet formation, which affects the density of 
cloud above the ocean surface. A higher cloud density reduces the temperature and 
consequently the DMS flux. This allows an increase in temperature in the absence of 
cloud formation, which completes the cycle.(16) How far does the evidence suggest 
homeostatic regulation of temperature? Recent experiments show that the regulation of 
DMS production is very complex.(17) Furthermore, there is no evidence of a direct 
relationship between DMS production and climate changes.(18) These apparent 
inconsistencies in the data are important, since they point to a relationship between 
sulphur cycling and climate, but fall short of providing firm evidence for feedback 
regulation controlled by the biota. At best it seems to me that there is limited support for 
local Gaian systems acting in such a way so as to include biota in geophysiological 
processes such as the cycling of sulphur between the sea to the land. 
 
(c) The Cooperative Evolutionary Model 
This idea is one which draws on Lovelock's belief that Gaia is part of the evolutionary 
process of the earth. The language used to describe Gaia is that of a single organism, 
which has evolved so as to allow the persistence of life. The belief amongst scientists 
that the earth acts as a single organism is not new and was held by the Scottish scientist 
James Hutton in 1785 and the Russian scientist/philosopher Yergraf Korolenko who 
lived in the last century in the Ukraine.(19) An alternative to Lovelock's model is that 
inorganic material and life evolved together through a process described as co-
evolution.(20) Lovelock assumes that Gaia evolved independently of life, but emerged 
as a type of ‘awakening’ with the evolution of photosynthetic organisms, that is ones 
which could use carbon dioxide and sunlight as a form of energy.(21) The difficulty with 
all such speculations is that it is not possible to design a scientific test to prove these 
ideas.(22) It therefore clashes with one of the paradigms of science that requires an idea 
to be testable if it is to call itself science.(23) 
 
The belief that the whole planet cooperates so as to act as a single organism seems to 
suggest a cooperative model for evolution rather than the competitive model 
characteristic of Darwin's theory. All species are acting in concert for the survival of the 
whole, rather than competing for individual survival. The concept that species evolved in 
such a way so as to encourage cooperation is especially popular amongst 
sociobiologists.(24) The cooperative behaviour which has evolved in species such as 
ants and other social animals becomes a model for human behaviour. This has clear 
ethical implications, which I will discuss below. The opposite alternative is that evolution 
has favoured the development of behaviour which is based on self-interest alone, the so 
called ‘Selfish Gene’ model of Richard Dawkins.(25) His model has attracted more 
hostility, perhaps, than the cooperative model of E.O. Wilson. Both seek to extend 
biology into the realm of ideology through evolutionary ideas. Lovelock's Gaia is more 
aligned to Wilson's position, though it has taken others to use his ideas as a basis for 
sociobiology.(26) 
 
(d) The Ideological/Teleological Model 
The above cooperative evolutionary model slides into an ideological/ teleological model 
for Gaia where ‘she’ becomes part of a philosophical ‘quest’.(27) While Lovelock has 
specifically denied that Gaia is teleological, some of the language he uses opens up the 
possibility of a teleological interpretation. He admits that over two thirds of those who 
wrote to him were concerned about the meaning of Gaia in the context of religious 
faith.(28) The way that Lovelock describes Gaia implies a consciousness, though that is 
not necessarily his intention. For example, in describing the ability of the earth to 
withstand violent interruptions from outer space he muses ‘It is a tribute to the strength 
of Gaia that our planetary home was restored so promptly and effectively after these 
events’.(29) In his reflections on God and Gaia he remarks: 
 
Belief in God is an act of faith and will remain so. In the same way it is otiose to 
try and prove that Gaia is alive. Instead, Gaia should be a way to view the Earth, 
ourselves and our relationships with living things.(30) 
 
The directedness of Gaia is, then, towards the persistence of life, rather than any 
particular form of life, such as humans. The resonance of Gaia as science with the 
ancient religious understanding of the earth goddess has been taken up by the eco-
feminist Anne Primavesi.(31) 
 
Bound up with the concept of Gaia as ideology is the belief that human beings need to 
move away from understanding themselves as ‘technologist toolmakers’ reconstructing 
the earth, to one where they consider themselves as cooperating with the earth in a 
balanced relationship.(32) Pedler uses Gaia as a basis for the idea of a ‘sustainable’ 
future, that is one where human beings and their environment are in harmony and are 
part of the Gaian organism.(33) 
 
2.  Ambiguous Ethical Implications 
 
Each of the above scientific interpretations of Gaia has ethical implications in terms of 
how far they serve to challenge or complement existing paradigms in environmental 
ethics. 
 
(a) The Move Towards Collective Value 
There is a wide spectrum of possible approaches to environmental ethics, from those 
who give priority to individuals, to those who consider collectives such as species, 
ecosystems and the biosphere have moral priority.(34) There is ‘a strong movement in 
environmental ethics towards ethical consideration of collectives’.(35) The Gaia 
hypothesis reinforces this shift towards collective value and uses a similar language of 
‘community’ and ‘organism’. Gaia challenges the ethical stance which opts for more 
individualistic positions, such as that of Paul Taylor where all individual organisms have 
their own particular purpose or telos which gives them inherent worth.(36) According to 
Taylor's biocentric view all living beings have equal moral status, whereas according to 
Gaia higher status would be given to those organisms which exerted the greatest 
influence on the environment. The homeostatic, evolutionary and teleological aspects of 
Gaia reinforce a consequential approach to ethics of a type pioneered by Aldo 
Leopold.(37) I will return to a discussion of this again below. I am arguing here that the 
scientific version of Gaia which requires us to make the least number of assumptions (la 
above) has ethical implications, as it encourages consideration of collectives rather than 
individuals. 
 
(b) Resource Management Approaches 
An understanding of Gaia which includes homeostatic processes can, ironically perhaps, 
lead to two completely different ethical positions. The first stance is adopted by those 
concerned with the idea of the earth providing resources for human use. A second 
stance is adopted by those interested in the idea of giving value to processes and 
systems which I will cover in (c) below. 
 
A resource management approach is not novel and is the most common attitude 
adopted by political organisations concerned with the environment. The focus is human-
centred and action is judged according to the possible benefit or otherwise for human 
beings. John Passmore argues that humanity alone generates values and that there are 
no proper grounds on which we can find values in the non-human world.(38) His 
approach is unashamedly anthropocentric, in contrast with the biocentric approach 
which extends value to non-human creatures, as in Leopold.  
 
It might seem anomalous that any Gaian view could be used to support an 
anthropocentric stance. The argument is as follows. The most extreme view, which 
barely deserves to be described as an ‘ethic’, is that since Gaian science shows that the 
earth will correct itself after change, human pollution is relatively incidental.(39) Not all 
conservationists welcome Gaian theory, as it seems to encourage a robust view of the 
earth which can withstand many more millennia of abuse by humans.(40) A more 
sophisticated view is that the human responsibility is to conserve those parts of the 
planet which act like the ‘vital organs’: that is the tropical rainforests, the deep sea algae 
and the prokaryotic bacteria.(41) Those species which are not essential to Gaian 
function would be dispensable. If Gaia was forced to a new equilibrium state this would 
lead to the destruction of many species, including humans. The survival of human 
beings, then, depends on avoiding any action which would force Gaia into a new 
equilibrium.(42) 
 
Lovelock seems to object to any ‘resource management’ ideas, as if human beings 
could ‘manage’ the affairs of the earth when we have failed to manage our own human 
relationships.(43) He believes that ideas such as ‘stewardship’ still encourage a short-
term focus and one that is too anthropocentric. This fails to consider the overall health of 
the planet. He argues that we should consider ourselves as partners to the planet, acting 
as ‘shopstewards’ and ‘representatives'’ of ‘bacteria, fungi, slime moulds and fish, birds 
and animals’. In this he seems to be moving away from a purely anthropocentric stance, 
though the threat of human extinction is still part of his call for humans to live in 
partnership. If we fail to adopt this approach ‘the rest of creation, will, as part of Gaia 
unconsciously move the earth itself to a new state, one where humans may no longer be 
welcome’.(44) 
 
 (c) Links With Systemic Value 
Although Lovelock has not worked out his ethical position in any rigorous way, his focus 
on partnership and consideration of the overall process of Gaia bears some 
resemblance to the environmental ethics of Holmes Rolston III.(45) Holmes Rolston 
gives value to the ecosystem and biosphere as one which is ‘life creating’. He describes 
systemic value in the following way: 
 
This cardinal value, like the history, is not at all encapsulated in individuals, it too 
is smeared out into the system. The value in this system is not just the sum of the 
part values ... Systemic value is the productive process, its products are intrinsic 
values woven into instrumental relationships.(46) 
 
He concludes, then, that ‘The objective systemic process is an overriding value, not 
because it is indifferent to individuals, but because the process is both prior to and 
productive of individuality’.(47) 
 
This would fit into a Gaian concept of a homeostatic process providing the means 
through which individual life is expressed. It seems to me that in giving attention to 
individual values Holmes Rolston avoids the danger implicit in other organismic ethical 
systems which can become forms of ecofascism - a point which I will return to under 
2(e). However, in certain respect the biological basis of Rolston's ideas is naive. His 
views tend to reinforce the concepts of ‘integrity’ and ‘stability’ in ecosystems in a way 
that do not exist in practice. Brennan similarly notes that many conservationists write as 
if the ecological research of the last century did not exist.(48) 
 
(d) An Extension of the Land Ethic 
Aldo Leopold's work, A Sand County Almanac, written in 1949, was highly influential in 
the more recent shift towards collective value.(49) He argued that the land, that is soils, 
waters, plants and animals, all deserve moral consideration as part of the community of 
life. Baird Collicott, who draws on Leopold for his work, also gives value to collectives, 
but he believes that values are human generated (anthropogenic).(50) This contrasts 
with the more anthropocentric positions which I discussed in 2(b) above. 
 
Callicott adopts a form of socio-biology where he considers that human beings have 
evolved in such a way that they treat non-humans as part of their community. The socio-
biologist, Richard Alexander believes that if we neglect the genetic basis for ethical 
behaviour, then we are bound to fail to find ways forward: 
 
those who have tried to analyse morality have failed to treat the human traits that 
underlie moral behaviour as outcomes of evolution - as outcomes of the process, 
dominated by natural selection, that forms the organising principle of modern 
biology.(51) 
 
Callicott supports the Darwinian idea that natural selection favours altruistic behaviour, 
rather than selfish behaviour. For him this altruism extends to include the wider 
community of animals, plants and land. Objections similar to that levied against socio-
biology in general include the problem of how we can distinguish between human 
behaviour that is generated by cultural factors and human behaviour that is genetically 
determined. More important, perhaps, socio-biological views encourage a form of 
biological determinism where human actions become determined by their genes.(52) 
This, is, ironically, the very opposite of the overall thrust of Gaian science, which is 
towards a more holistic, multidisciplinary approach. In this sense Callicott's views both 
cohere with and are in conjunction with the shift towards Gaia as ideology, which I will 
take up again below. 
 
(e) A Naturalistic Basis for Moral Value 
The tendency for a biological concept to become a basis for mythology is part of the 
history of the relationship between science and culture. For example, in the heyday of 
post-Darwinian science ‘Evolutionism’ was a powerful myth which seemed to offer a 
basis for a new philosophy which went beyond its role as a biological explanation for the 
origin of life.(53) It forms the foundation for subsequent socio-biological ideas, as well as 
those of Richard Dawkins. While E.O. Wilson would argue that Evolution has selected 
for altruistic behaviour, Dawkins suggests that Evolution has selected for selfish 
behaviour. Both authors assume that the behaviour puts the individual at a competitive 
advantage over other individuals. They are both relying on Darwinian notions of ‘survival 
of the fittest’. In a sense both are forms of biological determinism which are Utopian and 
pessimistic respectively. Dawkins' stance becomes obvious in statements such as: 
 
We are survival machines - robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the 
selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with 
astonishment.(54) 
 
Similar is an ethic which emerges from an understanding of Gaia as a foundation model 
for human behaviour. Sahtouris, for example, finds in Gaia clues for human 
behaviour.(55) She assumes that we are like immature adolescents who can only make 
progress by becoming more in tune with the inner workings of the planet. In this she 
echoes the eco-theology of Sallie McFague who regards sin as a failure to recognise our 
place in our planetary home.(56) 
 
There are various possible objections to this idea. The first, most obvious one is that 
Gaia herself is not as benevolent as in Sahtouris’ portrayal. Even Lovelock admits that 
Gaia keeps the world ‘warm and comfortable for those who obey the rules, but is 
ruthless in her destruction of those who transgress’.(57) 
 
A second objection is that of the so-called ‘naturalistic’ fallacy - the identification of 
something which is, in this case Gaia, with something that is good or valuable. 
Moreover, as I noted above, it is a strand of Gaia selected in a way which ignores the 
more ignoble qualities of the ‘system’. The overall conclusion of Lovelock's Gaia is that 
those parts of the planet which are most valuable are the tropical forests, prokaryotic 
bacteria and algae, a point which I referred to above. Some follow the logic of this view 
in a more consistent way and suggest that human beings are ‘parasites’ and like a 
‘cancer’ on the planet.(58) 
 
Gaia as ideology shares many of the problems of the so-called ‘deep ecology’ of Arne 
Naess, Warwick Fox and others.(59) Pedler, for example, speaks of a new lifestyle that 
is ‘Gaian’ where the ‘human race is an integral part of a single life force, sometimes 
called the earth organism, the earth spirit of Gaia’, which in practice is an ‘alternative to 
the ready made solutions offered by the industrial machine’.(60) It is a new 
consciousness that pervades every aspect of life, which is similar to deep ecology's 
focus as a ‘consciousness movement’, rather than an ethic per se.(61) 
 
The new consciousness, that calls for a realisation and extension of the self into an all 
inclusive idea where there are no distinctions between self and non-self, is highly 
problematic. Identification with everything leads to a form of eco-fascism which bears 
some resemblance to Stoic patterns of thought.(62) Ironically, perhaps, an extension of 
the self tends to project self into the world in an ‘anthropocentric’ way, which is the 
opposite of the supposed holistic 'dream' of deep ecology. While the Gaia hypothesis 
does not, in itself, imply this form of mergence of self with the earth, those who have 
taken up the ‘quest’ for Gaia seem to share the same ‘consciousness’.(63) It is as if the 
biological fact that we share the same molecules as nonliving matter gives us a rationale 
for a new metaphysics where all distinctions are ignored. 
 
John Milbank argues that ‘deep green’ views are deceptive since they fail to 
acknowledge that concern for 'nature' in itself requires a separation between subject and 
object.(64) A new objectivity was sought in nature, even at the start of modernity. The 
‘turn to nature’ is, then, part of the problem of modernity and so is unlikely to be the 
place where we find the ‘key to value’.(65) 
 
Gaia as ideology is also inconsistent with process philosophy. Two main criticisms are 
that Gaia is limited in its consideration of the earth rather than the whole universe and 
limited in its lack of consideration of the individual.(66) While both Gaia and process 
theology acknowledge ‘processes’ in the material world, Gaia takes a holistic stance that 
is lacking in process theology. Furthermore, the teleology that emerges in Gaian thought 
is very different from the teleology in process ideas, which are always directed towards 
individual maximum ‘enrichment’. For Gaian thought the directness, if it exists, is more 
general and towards the maintenance of life. 
 
In conclusion, at first sight the Gaia hypothesis could appear to present us with a model 
of life which supports one particular ethical stance or a form of ethical monism. However, 
the range of possible interpretations of Gaia from a scientific perspective mean that 
there is an equally wide range of ethical outcomes. This diversity leads to confusion in 
the debate since it is not always clear which particular version of Gaia is being used in 
support of a particular view. In particular, this highlights the problems of any attempt to 
find in the natural world a basis for ethics. A return to nature in Gaia is not likely to lead 
to clear ways forward and shares some of the problems of moral pluralism in general. 
There is an obvious danger of using Gaia as a way of supporting pre-determined ethical 
outcomes. However, there is little possibility that those who advocate a particular version 
of Gaia will be open enough to consider other possible ethical frameworks, such as that 
found in ethical systems based on the explicit recognition of ethical pluralism.(67) In this 
Gaia as a basis for ethics shares both the tendency for dogmatism in ethical monism 
and the tendency for relativism in ethical pluralism. 
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